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  1
“SLURRING” THE LINES BETWEEN 
INSENSITIVITY AND HOSTILITY: BOYER-
LIBERTO v. FONTAINEBLEAU CORP. AND 
THE EVALUATION OF TITLE VII RACIAL 
HARASSMENT CLAIMS 
KAYLA ACKLIN* 
Abstract: On May 7, 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
sitting en banc, held in favor of Reya C. Boyer-Liberto, an African American 
cocktail waitress employed by defendant Fontainebleau Corporation, who 
claimed racial harassment in violation of Title VII by fellow employee, Trudi 
Clubb. In Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., the majority based its analy-
sis on Clubb’s use of a racial epithet, twice in a twenty-four hour period, 
which they determined was severe or pervasive enough to create a racially 
hostile work environment, even in isolation. The separate concurring and dis-
senting opinions emphasized the majority’s departure from precedent estab-
lished in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton. 
Both the concurrence and dissent were concerned that the majority’s decision 
would increase segregation in the workplace, which would be counter-
productive to Title VII’s purpose, and would lead to an increase in frivolous 
employment litigation. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, sitting en 
banc, vacated the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland’s decision 
to grant summary judgment in favor of Fontainebleau Corporation on hos-
tile work environment and retaliation claims based on racial harassment.1 In 
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., Reya C. Boyer-Liberto, an African 
American cocktail waitress employed by defendant Fontainebleau Corpora-
tion (“Fontainebleau”), brought a claim after experiencing an incident of 
racial harassment at the Clarion Resort Fontainebleau Hotel (“Clarion”) 
where she was employed.2 Boyer-Liberto’s claim of racial harassment was 
based on a twenty-four hour period during which she was called a “porch 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2015–2016. 
 1 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp. (Boyer-Liberto III), 786 F.3d 268, 268 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(en banc) (vacating the award of summary judgment and remanding to district court). 
 2 Id. 
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monkey” twice and threatened with termination of her job by Trudi Clubb, a 
Caucasian Food and Beverage Manager at the Clarion.3 
After she reported the harassment to management, Boyer-Liberto was 
terminated from her position at the hotel.4 Then, after exhausting her admin-
istrative remedies with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), Boyer-Liberto filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Maryland, alleging hostile work environment and retaliation pur-
suant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. section 
1981 (“section 1981”), which prohibits employment discrimination based 
on race.5 Following discovery, Fontainebleau filed a motion for summary 
judgment, which the district court granted, and Boyer-Liberto appealed.6 
A 2-to-1 panel decision, written by Judge Paul V. Niemeyer for the 
Fourth Circuit, affirmed the district court’s judgment.7 The Fourth Circuit, 
upon granting a rehearing en banc, ultimately vacated the district court’s 
decision, remanding for further proceedings.8 The concurring and dissenting 
opinion of Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III argued that the majority’s hostile 
work environment conclusion was without precedent but that the retaliation 
claim should be remanded. 9  Judge Niemeyer’s dissent argued that the 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Id. On two occasions Clubb berated Boyer-Liberto, persistently shouting in close proximity 
to Boyer-Liberto’s face, threatening her by saying, “I’m going to make [you] sorry.” Id. at 269–
70. 
 4 Id. at 268. In Boyer-Liberto’s first attempt to report the harassment, Clubb interrupted the 
meeting by claiming that she was more important than the Clarion’s Food and Beverage Director, 
thereby effectively preventing Boyer-Liberto from completing her complaint. Id. at 270. 
 5 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012); 42 U.S.C § 1981 (2012); Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 
271. “Section 1981” is the general code provision establishing equal rights under the law, which, 
when applied to employment situations, establishes the same test as 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a)(1) for 
hostile work environment claims. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2008); 42 U.S.C § 1981 (1988); see 
Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 277. 
 6 Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 271, 274. The district court agreed with the defendants’ con-
tention that Clubb’s conduct was not severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environ-
ment or support the belief that one was in progress. Id. at 274. Therefore, Boyer-Liberto’s racial 
harassment complaint was not a protected activity, and she was thereby not protected from retalia-
tion. Id. at 271, 274, 275. 
 7 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp. (Boyer-Liberto II), 752 F.3d 352, 352–53 (4th Cir. 
2014). 
 8 Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 276. A majority of the judges in “regular active service” of 
the Fourth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc because a genuine issue of material fact existed as 
to whether the use of a racial slur by a supervisor, twice, was severe enough conduct to create a 
hostile work environment. Id. 
 9 Id. at 293 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Judge Wilkinson argued 
that the majority was correct in allowing Boyer-Liberto’s retaliation claim to continue, but wrong 
in not affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the Title VII claim because 
allowing such single, isolated incidents to be causes for Title VII claims would increase segrega-
tion in the workplace, and increase interracial distance among co-workers. Id. 
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court’s conclusions were without precedent because they were based on a 
misinterpretation of the existing precedent.10 
Part I of this Comment outlines the factual and procedural history of 
Boyer-Liberto. Part II discusses the majority’s departure from previous 
standards of evaluation of Title VII hostile work environment and retalia-
tion claims. Part III advocates for a return to precedent when evaluating 
Title VII hostile work environment and retaliation claims in order to avoid 
frivolous racial harassment claims filed against employers, and to maintain 
the purpose of Title VII in reducing workplace segregation and racial hostil-
ity. 
I. BOYER-LIBERTO’S CLAIM OF RACIAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 
In August 2010, Reya C. Boyer-Liberto began working in the Food 
and Beverage Department at the Clarion, an oceanfront hotel in Ocean City, 
Maryland.11 Boyer-Liberto had various roles, including restaurant and ban-
quet server, bartender, and cocktail waitress.12 
On September 14, 2010, when Boyer-Liberto was working as a cock-
tail waitress in the nightclub, one of her customers ordered a “Hula Hula” 
drink, which the bartender in the main bar refused to fill.13 In order to 
please her customer, Boyer-Liberto went behind the main bar to the pub bar 
where she found a bartender that would make a “Hula Hula.”14 Once the 
drink was prepared, to avoid confrontation with the main room bartender, 
Boyer-Liberto chose a new path back to the nightclub that took her through 
the restaurant kitchen.15 After going to the server station to print a guest 
check, Boyer-Liberto was confronted by Trudi Clubb, who, unbeknownst to 
Boyer-Liberto, had been yelling at Boyer-Liberto as she passed through the 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Id. at 293–94 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). Judge Niemeyer argued that the majority’s inter-
pretation of cases including Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) and Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998) was inaccurate and extended Title VII liability beyond 
the scope the Supreme Court had previously recognized. Id. at 297. 
 11 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp. (Boyer-Liberto III), 786 F.3d 268, 269 (4th Cir. 
2015) (en banc). The Clarion contained “guest rooms, several restaurants and bars, a nightclub, 
and a conference center with meeting and banquet facilities.” Id. 
 12 Id. Boyer-Liberto was told her assignments in these various roles were part of her training, 
as she had only been at the Clarion for seven weeks. Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
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kitchen.16 Clubb’s shouting escalated to threats, and concluded with Clubb 
calling Boyer-Liberto a “damn porch monkey.”17 
Upon arriving for the dinner shift the next day, Boyer-Liberto went to 
Clarion’s management office to report Clubb’s conduct.18 Clubb interrupted 
the meeting and reprimanded Boyer-Liberto in a “raised and angry voice” 
for passing through the kitchen the previous night.19 Clubb threatened to 
report Boyer-Liberto’s misconduct to the hotel owner, and once again called 
Boyer-Liberto a “porch monkey.”20 
On a phone call with Human Resources Director Nancy Berghauer on 
September 17, 2010, Boyer-Liberto complained that Clubb had racially har-
assed her.21 Boyer-Liberto’s complaint included the allegation that Clubb 
had twice called her a “porch monkey.”22 Upon reviewing the complaint, 
Clarion’s owner and General Manager advised Clubb that she needed to be 
cautious about using potentially derogatory or racist phrases.23 According to 
Clarion’s owner, the complaint prompted him to inquire about Boyer-
Liberto’s work performance.24 After reviewing a negative work evaluation 
from Boyer-Liberto’s supervisor, Clarion’s owner terminated Boyer-
Liberto’s employment.25 
In January 2012, after exhausting remedies with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Boyer-Liberto brought a Title VII 
claim based on race discrimination deriving from a hostile work environ-
ment against Fontainebleau Corp. in the U.S. District Court for the District 
                                                                                                                           
 16 Id. at 269. Clubb initially decided to reprimand Boyer-Liberto because she had wrongfully 
passed through the kitchen, but continued because she believed Boyer-Liberto had heard her, but 
had ignored her. Id. 
 17 Id. at 270. As Boyer-Liberto worked at the server station, Clubb continued yelling until she 
finally approached Boyer-Liberto, coming within inches of her face, spraying Boyer-Liberto with 
saliva as she yelled. Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. Clubb prevented Boyer-Liberto from detailing her complaint to management by leading 
Boyer-Liberto out of the management offices to nearby tables where she continued to threaten 
Boyer-Liberto’s job. Id. 
 20 Id. Boyer-Liberto did not know that Clubb held a manager title and did not consider Clubb 
to be her manager. Id. at 270–71. From Boyer-Liberto’s perspective, Clubb was just a “glorified 
hostess.” Id. at 270. Nonetheless, Boyer-Liberto felt “extremely singled out” by Clubb and per-
ceived that “[her] position was being threatened by [Clubb].” Id. at 271. 
 21 Id. at 270. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. Clubb denied she had ever called Boyer-Liberto a “porch monkey.” Id. 
 24 Id. This was the first time ever that Clarion management had reviewed Boyer-Liberto’s 
performance. Id. Clarion’s review process includes reviewing evaluations from supervisors and 
consulting with both the General Manager and Human Resources about the employee. See id. 
 25 Id. The Food and Beverage Director of the Clarion “gave a negative evaluation of Boyer-
Liberto and attributed her variety of job assignments to failure” in each role she was given, rather 
than as a form of her training, which she was initially told was to enable her to learn all of the 
positions within the Food and Beverage Department. Id. at 269–70. 
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of Maryland.26 Following discovery, the defendants filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that Clubb’s conduct was not severe or pervasive 
enough to create an abusive work environment and that Boyer-Liberto 
could not establish that she undertook a protected activity by making her 
racial harassment complaint to Clarion management.27 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland granted summary 
judgment, relying on precedent for the evaluation of hostile work environ-
ment and retaliation claims.28 The court stated that “hostile work environ-
ments generally result only after an accumulation of discrete instances of 
harassment.” 29  The district court ruled that an isolated racist comment 
would not create an environment of racial hostility that would alter the con-
ditions of employment and would not give rise to the belief that a hostile 
work environment existed.30 
A three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit, led by Judge Niemeyer, 
unanimously confirmed the district court’s judgment granting the defend-
ants summary judgment for the hostile work environment claim.31 The pan-
el concluded that Clubb’s use of the term “porch monkey” twice in a period 
of two days in regards to a single incident was not severe or pervasive 
enough “to change the terms and conditions of Boyer-Liberto’s employment 
                                                                                                                           
 26 Id. at 271. The original complaint asserted four claims: one claim each of hostile work 
environment and retaliation against Fontainebleau Corp. under Title VII, and one claim each of 
hostile work environment and retaliation against Fontainebleau Corp. and Clarion owner Dr. 
Leonard Berger under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Id. 
 27 Id. A protected activity, such as an internal complaint, is one in which an employee oppos-
es either “employment actions actually unlawful under Title VII” or “employment actions [she] 
reasonably believes to be unlawful.” E.E.O.C. v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 399, 406 (4th 
Cir. 2005). The defendant argued that Boyer-Liberto did not engage in a protected activity because 
she could not have reasonably believed that Clubb’s conduct was severe or pervasive enough to 
create a prohibited hostile work environment. Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 272. 
 28 Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 272. To determine whether an environment was sufficiently 
hostile or abusive, the courts look at all of the circumstances, including: (1) frequency of discrimi-
natory conduct, (2) severity, (3) whether the conduct was physically threatening or humiliating, or 
a “mere offensive utterance,” and (4) whether it unreasonably interfered with an employee’s work 
performance. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (2013) (remanding to determine 
whether a reasonable person would perceive the work environment to be hostile); see also Fara-
gher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998) (remanding case that held that simple 
teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents would not amount to discriminatory changes in 
employment). 
 29 Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 273 (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 
101, 115 (2002)). 
 30 Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp. (Boyer-Liberto I), No. 1:12-cv-00212, 2013 WL 
1413031 *3 (D. Md. Apr. 4, 2013) aff’d, 752 F.3d 350 (4th Cir. 2014) on reh’g en banc, 786 F.3d 
264 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated, 786 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2015) (“the two incidents of use of a racial 
epithet, assuming they occurred as Boyer-Liberto testified, simply do not comprise either perva-
sive or severe conduct, however unacceptable they are”). 
 31 Boyer-Liberto II, 752 F.3d at 353. 
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so as to be legally discriminatory.”32 Following the issuance of the panel’s 
decision, Boyer-Liberto sought rehearing en banc, which the Fourth Circuit 
granted.33 
II. RACIAL HARASSMENT AND RETALIATION UNDER BOYER-LIBERTO 
The Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, determined that an issue of materi-
al fact existed as to whether Clubb’s use of a racial slur towards Boyer-
Liberto, twice, was severe enough conduct to create a hostile work envi-
ronment.34 The Fourth Circuit also determined that Boyer-Liberto would be 
protected from retaliation for opposing an isolated incident of harassment 
when she reasonably believed that a hostile work environment was in pro-
gress.35 The Fourth Circuit remanded to the district court to evaluate Boyer-
Liberto’s hostile work environment and retaliation claims based on their 
interpretation of previous cases and Title VII claims.36 
A. Racial Harassment Has No Business in the Workplace 
Under Title VII, it is “unlawful employment practice for an employer 
. . . to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”37 The Supreme Court 
in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. ruled that Title VII is violated when a 
workplace is permeated with “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and 
insult” that are “severe or pervasive” enough to change the conditions of the 
victim’s employment and establish an abusive working environment.38 This 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Id. at 356. The court acknowledged that the term “porch monkey” was racially derogatory 
and highly offensive, and not condoned in light of their decision. Id. 
 33 Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 276. 
 34 Id. at 285. The majority recognized the term “porch monkey” as not only humiliating, but 
also “degrading and humiliating in the extreme,” and severe enough to create a hostile work envi-
ronment. Id. (quoting Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 181, 185 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
 35 Id. The majority viewed precedential standards for evaluation of hostile work environment 
and retaliation claims as standards that would deter harassment victims from speaking up about 
the harassment. Id. at 283. 
 36 Id. at 288. 
 37 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012); see Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786 
(1998); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Such violation would include 
requiring an African American woman to work in a racially hostile environment. See Harris, 510 
U.S. at 21. 
 38 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (involving a female, Teresa Harris, who worked at Forklift Sys-
tems, Inc. and was often insulted by company president, Charles Hardy, because of her gender, 
and was made the target of unwanted sexual innuendos). In order to establish a racially hostile 
working environment, a plaintiff has been required to show (1) unwelcome conduct, (2) that is 
based on the plaintiff’s race, (3) which is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiff’s 
2016] Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau and Title VII Racial Harassment 7 
standard has traditionally required conduct that is more than “merely offen-
sive.”39 Further, a plaintiff is required to show that the environment would 
be perceived as hostile or abusive as judged from the perspective of a rea-
sonable person in the plaintiff’s position.40 
To determine when there is a racially hostile environment, courts look 
at the totality of the circumstances.41 The very nature of a hostile work envi-
ronment claim, therefore, often involves repeated conduct.42 Isolated inci-
dents of harassment can only amount to discriminatory changes in employ-
ment if extremely severe and conducted by a supervisor.43 “Simple teasing,” 
offhand comments, and less serious isolated incidents would not satisfy a 
Title VII hostile work environment claim.44 
In deciding Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., the court examined 
Clubb’s conduct in regards to the two incidents of racial harassment toward 
Boyer-Liberto.45 The majority of the court viewed Clubb’s conduct as evi-
dence that Boyer-Liberto reasonably believed that Clubb could make a dis-
charge decision that would terminate Boyer-Liberto’s employment at the 
hotel.46 In light of her status as a supervisor, the majority viewed Clubb’s 
harassment toward Boyer-Liberto as particularly threatening and severe in 
nature to create a hostile work environment.47 In their conclusion, the ma-
                                                                                                                           
conditions of employment and to create an abusive work environment. Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d 
at 277. 
 39 Harris, 510 U.S. at 21. The Supreme Court has recognized that a “mere utterance” of an 
ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee would not affect the 
conditions of employment to a sufficiently significant degree to violate Title VII. Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. at 23. Courts look at (1) the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, (2) its severity, (3) 
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a “mere offensive utterance,” and (4) wheth-
er it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. Id. 
 42 Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115 (2002). Hostile or abusive con-
duct cannot, according to the Supreme Court, be measured in isolation. Id. 
 43 Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 277. The harasser qualifies as a supervisor rather than a co-
worker if “he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against 
the victim.” Id. at 278. 
 44 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788 (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 
U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (Thomas, J., concurring)) (involving female ocean lifeguard, Beth Ann Fara-
gher, whose immediate supervisors repeatedly subjected her to unwanted touching, lewd remarks, 
and offensive comments). 
 45 See Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 279. The court looked at the repeated communications 
with Boyer-Liberto, how Clubb openly admitted to “[having] Dr. Berger’s ear” and that she was 
more important than Boyer-Liberto’s direct supervisors, Boyer-Liberto’s concerns that her posi-
tion was being threatened, and the general manager’s assertion of Clubb’s authority by calling her 
“boss.” Id. at 279–80. 
 46 Id. at 280. The majority, led by Judge King, concluded that Clubb was a “supervisor” of 
Boyer-Liberto. Id. 
 47 Id. The majority determined that the use of the phrase “porch monkey” was akin to “nig-
ger,” and thereby held that “perhaps no single act can more quickly alter the conditions of em-
ployment and create an abusive working environment than the use of an unambiguously racial 
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jority made clear that the use of a racial epithet by a supervisor, if deter-
mined to be severe or pervasive, even if used in isolation in regards to a 
single incident, could satisfy a Title VII racially hostile work environment 
claim.48 
In his concurrence and disssent, Judge Wilkinson argued that the ma-
jority’s standard for evaluating Title VII claims was too open-ended.49 He 
advocated that an employer should be liable for a co-worker’s unlawful har-
assment if the employer was negligent with respect to the offensive behav-
ior, but not when the behavior was unprecedented and isolated to a single 
incident.50 He expressed serious concern that the majority’s decision would 
actually increase segregation in the workplace, which would be counterpro-
ductive to the purpose of Title VII.51 
Judge Niemeyer, in a separate dissent, argued that the majority’s con-
clusion was based on a misinterpretation and, therefore, was serious depar-
ture from precedent.52 Specifically, Judge Niemeyer argued that the majori-
ty’s standard did not reach the level of “severe or pervasive,” but was more 
akin to the “merely offensive standard” rejected in Harris, which requires 
only that incidents of harassment offend an employee because of their race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. 53  In focusing their analysis on 
Clubb’s use of a racial epithet only twice in a period of twenty-four hours, 
the dissent argued that the majority expanded Title VII beyond the scope in 
which it was intended.54 
                                                                                                                           
epithet such as ‘nigger’. . . .” Id. (quoting Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 181, 185 (4th 
Cir. 2001)). 
 48 Id. at 280–81. The majority’s standard for determining whether a racial epithet is sufficient-
ly severe or pervasive involves a subjective interpretation of the incident of harassment. See id. 
 49 See id. at 289 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 50 Id. Judge Wilkinson declined to hold an employer vicariously liable for actions of co-
workers. Id. 
 51 Id. at 292–93. Judge Wilkinson argued that the workplace is a place where racial interac-
tions are most frequent, and stated that it would be unfortunate if the decision in Boyer-Liberto 
creates more “separatist habits” that are frequently prevailing in other venues such as schools and 
neighborhoods. Id. at 292. 
 52 Id. at 293–94 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that in their examination of 
Faragher, the majority ignored the portion of the discussion requiring an examination of the to-
tality of the circumstances when evaluating Clubb’s conduct toward Boyer-Liberto. Id. at 294; see 
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787–88 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22, 23). 
 53 See Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 298. The Court in Harris rejected the “merely offensive 
standard” when evaluating a hostile work environment claim because it inadequately measures the 
effect of harassment on work conditions. See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22. 
 54 Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 297 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that a 
mere “lack of racial sensitivity does not, alone, amount to actionable harassment.” Id. at 294. 
Clubb clearly demonstrated a lack of racial sensitivity, but Judge Niemeyer asserted that it was not 
evident that her single incident of harassment would lead to a racially hostile work environment. 
Id. at 305. 
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Judge Niemeyer also argued that the majority misinterpreted Faragher 
v. City of Boca Raton by reading the phrase “isolated incidents” to mean 
that a “single incident” could satisfy the severity requirement of the Harris 
standard if such incident was extremely severe or pervasive.55 By failing to 
recognize the requirement of more than one incident of harassment that is 
severe or pervasive, the majority incorrectly determined that Clubb’s con-
duct satisfied a Title VII claim.56 
B. Retaliation Following a Harassment Claim in the Workplace 
The Fourth Circuit in Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp. deter-
mined that employees are protected from retaliation when they report to 
their supervisors about suspected violations of Title VII if they can prove 
that (1) they engaged in a protected activity; (2) that their employer took an 
adverse employment action against them; and (3) that there was a causal 
link between the two events.57 The Jordan court ruled that an employee is 
protected from retaliation if, at the time of her complaint, she had “an ob-
jectively reasonable belief” that a Title VII violation had happened or was 
in progress.58 Evidence that a Title VII violation had happened or was in 
progress usually occurs after there have been multiple incidents of harass-
ment.59 
The majority in Boyer-Liberto disagreed with the district court’s anal-
ogy to Jordan.60 Instead, the majority determined that the proper standard 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Id. at 294. The Court in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton specifically used the plural form of 
“incidents” to require the showing of more than one incident of harassment. See id. The dissent 
pointed out the majority’s failure to note lengthy portions of the Faragher decision in which the 
Court said that “mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in 
an employee would not sufficiently alter the terms and conditions of employment to violate Title 
VII.” Id.; see Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787. 
 56 Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 294 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). The dissent asserted that if 
the majority had correctly interpreted Faragher, they would have analyzed Clubb’s conduct to be 
more akin to a mere utterance of a racial epithet or a demonstration of racial insensitivity. Id. at 
299. 
 57 E.E.O.C. v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 399, 406 (4th Cir. 2005); see Jordan v. Al-
ternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 338–41 (4th Cir. 2006), overruled by Boyer-Liberto III, 
786 F.3d 264 (ruling that a fellow employee using the phrase “black monkeys” did not create a 
racially hostile work environment despite being “unacceptably crude and racist” because it was an 
isolated response that did not alter the terms and conditions of the employee’s employment). 
 58 Jordan, 458 F.3d at 340. The employee must be able to demonstrate that the conduct being 
objected to was likely to recur at such a level as to create a hostile work environment, and that the 
action was actually unlawful under Title VII. See id. at 339. 
 59 Id. The court in Jordan required this standard for a retaliation claim to ensure that employ-
ees felt free to report harassment in the workplace, but did not turn simple socializing into grounds 
for a Title VII claim. Id. at 342. 
 60 See Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 281. The majority disputed the analogy because Jordan 
did not involve an incident of harassment by a supervisor, which the court viewed to be more 
severe than an incident by a fellow employee. Id. The majority further disagreed with Jordan 
10 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 36:E. Supp. 
for analyzing retaliation claims based on isolated incidents of harassment 
was to focus on the severity of the harassment.61 The majority held that an 
employee is protected from retaliation for challenging a single harassment 
incident when she reasonably believes that a hostile work environment ex-
ists, and that she is not required to show additional evidence that such an 
environment is likely to occur.62 With this new standard, the court held that 
Boyer-Liberto reasonably believed a hostile work environment existed, and 
therefore concluded that Boyer-Liberto was protected from retaliation when 
she filed the Title VII claim.63 
III. THE THREAT OF RE-SEGREGATION IN THE WORKPLACE 
Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp. is not about whether an employ-
ee should be allowed to call a fellow employee a “porch monkey,” because 
slurs like that clearly do not belong in the workplace.64 Nor is it about 
whether an employee should report such an incident to workplace manage-
ment.65 At its core, Boyer-Liberto is about the standard for evaluation of 
Title VII racial harassment and retaliation claims and the majority’s serious 
departure from precedent established in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. and 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.66 
The majority’s decision in Boyer-Liberto effectively holds employers 
vicariously liable under Title VII for remarks made by one of their employ-
ees without requiring prior notice to the employer or prior awareness that an 
employee has racist tendencies.67 By imposing employer liability for re-
marks made by mid-level workers in businesses that might include hun-
dreds of employees, the majority is pushing liability far beyond the intended 
scope of Title VII.68 Based on the majority’s decision, employees could find 
grounds to sue employers and will likely be successful on those suits when-
                                                                                                                           
because it ignored the possibility that a hostile work environment could develop without the intent 
to change the working conditions of African Americans through racial harassment, and thereby 
deterred harassment victims from speaking up. Id. at 282. 
 61 Id. at 284. The majority focused on whether the isolated incident of discriminatory conduct 
was physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance. Id. 
 62 Id.at 284–85. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 295 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
 65 Id. It is not disputed that employees should feel protected enough to report incidents of 
harassment to management. Id. at 290 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 66 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 
510 U.S. 17 (1993); Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 295 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
 67 See Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 289 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 68 See id. Liability under the majority’s standard essentially hinges upon utterance. See id. 
Judge Wilkinson pointed out that the courts cannot reasonably expect employers to censor every-
thing their employees say. Id. at 289–90. 
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ever they can show that an employee of arguably higher rank offended them 
in some manner. 69  Consequentially, this decision will lead to frivolous 
widespread litigation resulting from any everyday workplace comment that 
an individual finds offensive or humiliating.70 
This will likely lead to a devastating outcome of more segregated 
workplaces because employers may try avoiding liability by only hiring like 
individuals, thereby decreasing and potentially eliminating diversity in the 
workplace.71 By allowing single isolated incidents of racial harassment to 
be grounds for Title VII claims, the majority is incentivizing employers to 
create only homogeneous work environments.72 Employers may also choose 
to segregate employees into certain departments to avoid any potential clash 
of views, attitudes, and races that could lead to a lawsuit.73 Title VII was 
established to encourage integration of the workplace, but with this decision 
that may no longer happen.74 
The majority’s decision in Boyer-Liberto also establishes a lower 
threshold for Title VII claims against individuals, which essentially does not 
tolerate any racially offensive behavior.75 This low threshold will likely in-
crease racial hostility and tension in the workplace because individuals will 
fear that any subjectively racial remarks made, even if innocent in nature, 
will amount to civil liability.76 Employees may not know what to say or how 
to act amongst individuals of other races, and can in turn blame minority 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See id. at 304–05 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
 70 See id. at 303–05. Judge Niemeyer argued that this decision will also raise too many ques-
tions about what counts as “offensive.” Id. at 304. 
 71 See id. at 293 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority’s 
decision about vicarious liability would effectively undo decades of integration in the workplace. 
See id. 
 72 See id. at 292. Instead of an inclusive community in which individual characteristics can be 
“recognized, understood, celebrated, and embraced,” the result of the majority’s decision will be 
to eliminate the risk of liability by “walling-off” the workplace to diversity. See id. at 293. 
 73 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 798. Judge Wilkinson argued that the majority’s decision will 
push the workplace into the more separatist habits that prevail too frequently in other venues. See 
Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 292 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This 
will likely raise other Title VII issues, as discrimination in hiring is itself a Title VII violation. 42 
U.S.C § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012); 42 U.S.C § 1981 (2012). 
 74 Boyer-Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 292 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
Judge Wilkinson asserted that “the objects of civil rights laws are to eliminate discrimination, 
bring Americans together, and break down barriers,” and yet with decisions such as that of the 
majority, schools and neighborhoods are re-segregating more than they are integrating. See id. 
 75 See id. at 293 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). Single isolated incidents, or mere utterances of 
any racially insensitive content, are not tolerated by the majority, and are thereby subject to civil 
liability. See id. 
 76 See id. at 292 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“There would be no 
single correct way to behave around, no single correct thing to say to, a worker of another race or 
gender.”). 
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workers for the anxiety felt in the workplace.77 Racial minorities benefit 
from a higher threshold of allowable racial harassment because, by tolerat-
ing some offensive behavior, discussion of racial differences is encouraged 
and workplaces are able to become more integrated.78 Rather than disman-
tling racial barriers in the workplace as Title VII was intended, the majori-
ty’s decision will most likely establish new boundaries by eliminating 
communication among diverse employees.79 
In regards to retaliation claims, the majority’s standard departs from an 
“objectively reasonable standard” and makes ordinary socializing in the 
workplace actionable for discrimination claims.80 Although it is true that 
employees should feel free to report harassment to upper level management 
without being subject to retaliation, Title VII should not be turned into a 
“general civility code.”81 Therefore, ordinary tribulations of the workplace, 
such as the occasional use of abusive language, gender related jokes, and 
teasing, should not become grounds for discrimination and harassment 
claims.82 It would become too costly and it would be impossible for em-
ployers to regulate the conduct of their employees in an attempt to avoid 
liability under retaliation and Title VII claims.83 The majority’s decision in 
Boyer-Liberto is an outlier among other courts and extends Title VII liabil-
ity far beyond both the statute’s textual scope and what the Supreme Court 
has previously recognized.84 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Circuit in Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp. concluded 
that the use of a racial epithet twice in a twenty-four hour period in the 
workplace was so severe or pervasive that it satisfied a Title VII racially 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See id. Judge Wilkinson argued that increasing interracial distance would become the easi-
est way to avoid a “blot on one’s record.” Id. 
 78 See id. at 291–92. Re-segregating the workplace will limit the opportunity for racial minori-
ties to find diverse employment. See id. at 292. 
 79 See id. at 291–93. Judge Wilkinson remarks that “where every ambiguous or unintentional-
ly insensitive remark is going to be reported upstairs, employees naturally will seek to cluster with 
those who look, act, and think ‘like themselves.’” Id. at 293. 
 80 See id. at 292. Judge Wilkinson emphasized that it is crucial to use an objectively reasona-
ble standard to prevent simple offhand comments made by fellow employees in the workplace 
from becoming grounds for Title VII claims. Id. at 291. 
 81 See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. 
 82 See id. By making such remarks grounds for Title VII claims, the majority has established a 
work environment where individuals will be restricted from acting in a natural manner out of fear 
that they will inadvertently offend another employee and be liable for harassment. See Boyer-
Liberto III, 786 F.3d at 293 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 83 See id. at 290. 
 84 See id. at 302–03 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). Judge Niemeyer argued that the majority’s 
ruling is, therefore, unprecedented and broader than is necessary. Id. at 304. 
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hostile work environment claim. By doing so, the court established a new 
standard for employer liability in which demonstration of a single incident 
of racial insensitivity could establish a hostile work environment claim un-
der Title VII, as long as the employee believed such a hostile work envi-
ronment existed. With no other evidence of workplace racism, the Fourth 
Circuit should have affirmed the decision of the district court that Trudi 
Clubb’s conduct did not create a racially hostile work environment under 
Title VII. 
The implications of the majority’s decision are counterproductive to 
the purpose of Title VII. By holding individuals and employers liable for 
isolated racist remarks, the majority has effectively re-segregated the work-
place, which will have consequences for other Title VII protected groups. 
Employees will not want to interact with employees of diverse backgrounds 
out of fear of lawsuits. Employers, in turn, will also limit the integration of 
their workplaces. It would be a shame to see decades’ worth of integration 
wasted because of the decision of the court in Boyer-Liberto. 
